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It has been a matter of serious discussion among the international legal scholars that 
without the regulatory power of the state in domestic law, so many rules of international 
law are so frequently followed by so many states.
1 
 
Franck’s perception of legitimacy is a “perception on the part of those to whom it is 
addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process. Right process 
includes the notion of valid sources but also encompasses literary, socio-anthropological 
and philosophical insights.” 
2 
 
Dworkin identified three characteristics, which are conducive to the rule of law: fairness, 







have variously interpreted and applied Franck’s theory of legitimacy to various aspects of 
international legal situations. 
 
Franck discussed the concept of legitimacy starting from Max Weber to the strategic 
concept of legitimacy where contracting parties for the mutualizing advantage adopt the 
voluntary compliance. Weber emphasized the greater adherence of subjects to the rule of 
law if the subjects perceive both the rule and ruler as legitimate
9 whereas Schachter 
emphasized the role of “competence and authority” for a rule to be perceived to be 
obligatory
10.  Franck while discussing the above examples concluded that the above 
discussion placed “emphasis on non-coercive factors as conducing to rule – compliant 
behavior.”
11 
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Weiler
12 tried to discuss the legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement System while 
Palmeter
13 has discussed legitimacy in the context of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Aldonas
14 observed that as the Panels and the Appellate Bodies develop a body 
of jurisprudence that clarifies WTO members’ commitments, it “establishes the WTO’s 
legitimacy and commands the respect of its members” 
 
 
Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy 
 
The study of legitimacy in international rule occupies a very significant place in 
international relations because it envisages “the possibility of an orderly community 
functioning by consent and validated obligation”
15 Franck has further emphasized that the  
“the legitimacy of a rule, or of rule-making or rule-applying institution, is a function of a 
perception of those in the community concerned that the rule, or the institutions, has 
come into being endowed with legitimacy; that is in accordance with right process.”
16 
Legitimacy has been defined by Professor Franck as “a property of a rule or rule making 
institutions which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed 
normatively”
17 and also “the perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule making 
institution that that rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance 
with generally accepted principles of right process.”
18 
 
The primary purpose of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights
19 (TRIPS) was to ‘reduce distortion and impediments to international trade’ taking 
into account ‘effective and adequate protection’ to patents, copyrights and trademarks in 
private laws of different countries
20. TRIPS is supposed to provide for the protection of 
many forms of so called intellectual property such as Copyright, Trademarks, Industrial 
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20 Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, “Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
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Designs, Patents, Integrated Circuits Layouts, and Trade Secrets through enactment of 
national laws to meet certain limited standards. Otten and Wager even insisted that “the 
protection of intellectual property is one of the three pillars of the WTO, the other two 
being trade in goods (the area traditionally covered by the General Agreement on Tariffs 




There was not much divergence of views among the nations once they agreed to include 
TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Negotiations as far as copyrights and trademarks were 
concerned but the question of patent got intricately linked with technology transfer and 
promotion of public policies like public health and emergency and led to a series of 
frictional developments. A large number of countries appear to evince skepticism about 
the possibility of TRIPS fulfilling any of its cherished goals of removing distortions and 
impediments to international trade and promoting “technological innovation” and  “the 
transfer and dissemination of technology”
22. 
 
Reluctance of different countries, including many developed countries to adopt 
provisions of TRIPS is still keeping scholars busy discussing the approach to be adopted 
to introduce TRIPS compliant provisions in their domestic laws
23.  
 
In this article an attempt is made to find helpful perspective on this dilemma in the work 
of international legal scholar Thomas Franck against the background of his theory of 
international legitimacy. The theory developed in Franck’s “The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations”
24 and in his earlier article “Legitimacy in the International System”
25 is 
based on the presumption that different international law exerts different “pull to 
compliance” depending upon the extent to which “the rule is characterized by greater or 
lesser” legitimacy. A major weakness of TRIPS has been uncertainty and unpredictability 
in its scope and the total reliance for interpretations on the institutions from certain 
industries and the judicial and the non-judicial institutions in the developed countries. 
This Theory of Legitimacy isn’t only applicable to the states in the international 
community but also to other international institutions.  
 
Franck has analyzed legitimacy in terms of four factors: 
 
1.  Determinacy 
2.  Symbolic Validation 
                                                                   
21 A. Otten and H. Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 Vanderbilt J. 
Transnational Law., 391, 393 (1996) 
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23 Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement comes of age: Conflict or Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries?, 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, p.  (2000) 
24 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) Oxford University Press, USA 
25 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 American Journal of International Law, 
705 (1988)   4 
3.  Coherence  
4.  Adherence (to a normative hierarchy) 
 
Franck has used the notion of “justice”  when he states “A treaty may be the locus of a 
lively dispute between those who wish to see it obeyed because it is legitimate even 
though unjust and others who wish to see it repealed or even violated because it is unjust 
although legitimate.”26  In his book ‘Fairness in International Law and Institutions’27 
Franck argued that “If a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of legitimacy 




Determinacy and Legitimacy 
 
Although Franck started with the textual clarity as defining determinacy i.e. “the ability 
of the text to convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see 
through  the language to the meaning”, subsequent discussion by Franck indicates that 
determinacy in the form of certainty in the treaty interpretation is the fundamental 
perquisite to legitimize a treaty. Franck observed that,  “For present purposes it is enough 
merely to note once more that clarity and certainty are, usually, but not invariably, 
synonymous with determinacy.”
29 Franck discussed the example of the difference 
between two textual formulations defining the boundary of the underwater continental 
shelf to suggest the importance of certainty in an international treaty. In the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf
30, the boundary of the Continental Shelf was defined 
as the shelf at “a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.” 
Compared to the 1958 Convention, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea31 is far 
more definite and specific and the definition of the continental shelf has been given as 
“the natural prolongation of …land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, 
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial shelf is measured” and certain important factors such as “the  thickness of 
sedimentary rocks” and a limit on outermost line that” shall not exceed 100 nautical miles 
from the 2,500 meters isobath” are specifically mentioned. The isobath has also been 
specifically defined as a line connecting the points where the waters are 2500 meters 
deep.
32 Franck concluded that, “The 1982 standard, despite its complexity is far more 
determinate than the elastic standard in the 1958 Convention, which, in a sense, 
                                                                   
26 Franck (1990), p. 238 
27 Thomas M. Franck, 1995, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford Clarendon Press,  
28 Franck (1995), p. 481 
29 Franck (1990), p. 60 
30 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art 1, April 29, 1958, 15 UST 471, TIAS No. 5578, 499 UNTS 
311 
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 76, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention of the Law 
of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E. 83.V.5 (1983), 21 ILM 1261 (1982) 
32 Franck (1988), p. 714   5 
established no rule at all…Indeterminate normative standards not only made it harder to 
know what conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance”
33  
 
Franck has maintained that states are normally inclined to violate a rule of conduct to 
take advantage of sudden opportunity but this temptation may be checked if the rule is 
“sufficiently specific to support reasonable expectations that benefit can be derived in a 
contingent future by strengthening the rule in the present instance.”34  
 
Franck gave an example of the cost of indeterminacy by the rules prohibiting and 
defining aggression by the United Nations General Assembly after 7 years of debate. 
While dealing with determinacy, Franck made another very pertinent point that “A 




However, Franck did not confine his concept of determinacy within the situation, which 
happened to be ‘essentially binary’, or is applicable of a true-false test. In situations of 
exceptional complexity and ambiguity which normally happens in the case of 
international treaties, the ambiguities and the errors of interpretations can be resolved by 
a forum or fora which in its turn must have attributes of legitimacy.  
 
Process determinacy is the situation where “ambiguity can be resolved case by case” 
through the introduction of a forum which can mitigate “the textual elasticity of the rule.” 
However, the forum itself should be perceived as “having come into being in accordance 
with right process. In practice legitimacy of a forum can be tested in the same way as that 
of a rule: by reference to the determinacy of its charter, its pedigree, the coherence of its 
mandate and its adherence to the normative institutional hierarchy of international 
organization.”
36. Franck gave a number examples of   situations where determinacy in 
specific conflict was introduced in the treaty through such fora
37. 
 
This article will show that the TRIPS Agreement particularly Articles 1.1, 27 and 33 have 
used language, which has resulted in introduction of extreme forms of ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the TRIPS Agreement. This article further shows that an examination of 
the Panel and the Appellate  Body Reports dealing with patenting and similar provisions 
suggests that these fora are creating significant problems in process determinacy and the 
results have been more adverse than useful especially for developing countries. 
                                                                   
33 Franck (1988), p. 714 
34 Franck (1988),  p. 716 
35 Franck (1990), p. 238 
36 Franck, (1988)  p. 725. Franck was quite categorical about the legitimacy of forum to arrive at process 
determinacy when he observed, “They (forums) will only succeed, however, if they are seen to be acting in 
accordance with their specific mandate and the general principles of fairness; that is, in a disinterested, 
principle fashion and not simply to gratify some short-term self-interest of a faction. Moreover, each rule 
decision emanating from legitimate forum is itself subject to the test of its perceived legitimacy; its 
determinacy, coherence, and so forth” p. 725 
37 Franck (1988) gave examples from Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 ICJ REP. 
13, 30 31 (judgement of June 3), North Sea continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP. 3, 54 
(Judgement of Feb. 20), Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ), 1982 ICJ REP. 18, 35 
(Judgement of Feb. 24)   6 
Symbolic Validation and legitimacy 
 
Just like determinacy, symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree also influence voluntary 
obedience and pull to compliance. Symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree are related but 
not identical. Whereas symbolic validation uses certain cues for obedience, ritual is a 
specialized form of symbolic validation. Rituals are normally seen as ceremonies and 
provide unspoken basis for compliance pull like the oath of office sworn by the US 
President. In this article, rituals as a major force have not been adopted. However, the 
notion of pedigree is quite important for explaining the compliance pull of “rules or rule-
making institutions by emphasizing their historical origins, their cultural or 
anthropological deeprootedness.”
38. State recognition has been described by Franck as 
illustrating the importance of pedigree. Schachter has tried to emphasize the long lineage 
of rules such as codification practice followed by the International Law Commission after 
long deliberations as being more attractive for compliance than a fresh development.
39 
Franck also suggested that a “new rule may be taken more seriously if it arrives on the 
scene under the aegis of a particularly venerable sponsor such as a widely ratified 




In the context of the World Bank, Franck suggested that, “This equality of participation is 
itself the symbolic representation of a confluence between sovereignty and 
interdependence that holds together the “community” of states”
41. Franck has 
subsequently developed the concept of pedigree as having its own rules and standards 
and that these standards provide a fairly high degree of formal determinacy prohibiting 
“self-serving interpretations”.  Franck also cautioned against the general acceptance of 
symbolic validation and pedigree in the context of compliance and asserted that  the 
rituals themselves have to be legitimate and the standards for pedigreeing are applied 
coherently to give legitimacy to an international treaty. 
 
This article argues that because of the way the TRIPS Agreement was prepared, the 
circumstances contemporaneous with its completion, and certain aspects of its treatment 
of questions related to patents, there are substantial problems associated with pedigree 
which does not attract compliance by the parties involved. 
 
 
Coherence and Legitimacy  
 
Coherence or symbolic equality creates “presumption against all purported interpretations 
of existing rules—and against proposed new rules—that would make arbitrary 
distinctions between the rights and duties of different states or governments”.42 Using the 
definition of coherence from Ronald Dworkin, that “a rule is coherent when like cases are 
                                                                   
38 Franck, (1988) p. 726 
39 Oscar Schachter, Towards a theory of International Obligation, 8 Vanderbilt Journal of International 
Law, 300, 310 (1968) 
40 Franck (1988) p. 727 
41 Franck (1988), p. 731 
42 Franck, 1988, p. 737   7 
treated alike in application of the rule and when the rule relates in a principled fashion to 
other rules of the same system”
43, Franck noted that incoherence directly questions the 
effect of validity by undermining the standard, rules and processes used which in turn 
question the legitimacy of the institutions responsible for validating. Weiner while 
interpreting Franck’s theory of legitimacy opined that incoherence leads to establishment 
of “cognitive dissonance in the audience to which it is addressed.”
44 Dworkin has used 
the word “integrity” or “consistency” which requires that a rule must be applied 
uniformly in every “similar” or “applicable” instance.  
 
Franck has tried to identify another aspect of coherence, which he called the “underlying 
general principle” connecting rule, standard, or symbolic validation to a network of other 
rules. Franck concluded that “coherence mandates a connectedness between various 
component parts of a rule or code; between several applications of a rule in various 
instances; and between the general principles underlying a rule’s application and those 
implicated in other rules.”
45 
 
Franck further elaborated the role of coherence in his book ‘The Power of Legitimacy 
Among Nations’ and observed that coherence legitimates a rule, principle, or 
implementing institution because it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or 
the application of a rule, to (1) its own principle purpose, (2) principles previously 
employed to solve similar problems, and (3) a lattice of principles in use to resolve 
different problems.
46 The given rule must be in certain harmony with the existing 
network of rules of which the present rule is a part.  
 
This article argues that as a consequence of the introduction of certain provisions in 
TRIPS in the form of extending monopoly to import and extend and  discriminatory 
extension of patent provisions, TRIPS severely compromises the extent to which its terms 
show some of the qualities of Franck’s coherence. This article suggests that one reason 
TRIPS will not experience success in terms of its acceptability is that the TRIPS 
Agreement is, in the sense of Franck’s theory, substantially illegitimate. Accordingly, this 
article concludes that if the TRIPS is to be treated as an internationally accepted 
agreement, a number of changes have to be introduced into the TRIPS Agreement  
 
 
Adherence (to a Normative Hierarchy) and Community 
 
The lack of crucial procedural “secondary” rules in the international legal system makes 
the whole system primitive if not illusory. Hart has also alleged that the lack of a 
“uniform rule of recognition”
47 such as the U.S. Constitution or British Rule of 
Parliamentary Supremacy, and specific sources of law are a serious disqualification for 
an international legal system.   Franck adopted Hart’s concept of hierarchy of secondary 
                                                                   
43 R. Dworkin, Laws Empire, 176-224 (1986) 
44 Anthony S. Weiner, ‘The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of legitimacy’, Journal of 
International Law & Business, Fall 1998, 19, p. 1, 22  
45 Franck, 1988, p. 750 
46 Franck (1990), pp. 147-148 
47 Franck (1988) p. 752   8 
rules starting from the “ultimate rule of recognition”
48 corresponding to H.L.A. Hart’s 
concept of a “rule of recognition” and going down  to a  “pyramid of secondary rules 
about how rules are made, interpreted and applied: rules, in other words, about rules.”  
The primary rule of obligations without adherence to a system of secondary rules of 
process has been termed by Franck as nothing but  ad hoc reciprocal arrangements. 
However, Franck observed that the international system is better developed than had been 
visualized by Hart and as shown by a number of institutions such as the International 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice and the presence of arbitrators that “it 
has an extensive network of horizontally coherent rules, rule making institutions, and 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to apply the rules impartially”
49. Franck has described 
the rule of ultimate recognition as having such extraordinary power so as to validate the 
primary rule of obligations as well as the secondary rule of procedural nature.  
 
Palmeter has discussed Hart’s
50 primary and secondary rule concept in connection with 
the World Trade Organization as a legal system although his interpretation appears to be 
little too simple.
51  However, Palmeter has used a very valid term “thickening of legality” 
coined by Professor Celso Lafer, former Ambassador and permanent Representative of 
Brazil to the WTO to denote the proliferation of rules in the WTO.
52 According to Hart, 
the secondary rules specify the manner of conclusively ascertaining, introducing, 
eliminating, varying and determining the violations of primary rules. Although Hart has 
described three types of secondary rules, i.e. (1) rules of recognition, (2) rules of 
adjudication, and (3) rules of change, the rules of recognition are by Franck as the most 
important. 
 
The ultimate rule of recognition is more in the nature of peremptory norms when Franck 
observed that, “Ultimate rules of recognition cannot be validated by reference to any 
other rule. All other secondary rules of the community are inferior to, and validated by, 
the ultimate rule or set of rules.”
53 If sovereignty resides in anything, it is in the rules 
themselves and States are aware of this “rule’s autochthony” as illustrated by the 
advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on April 26, 1988. 
The ICJ stated unequivocally that it is  “the fundamental principle of international law 
that it prevails over domestic law, “ and that “the provisions of municipal law cannot 
prevail over those of a treaty.”54 
                                                                   
48 Franck (1990) p. 184 
49 Franck (1988), p. 753 
50 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Chapter 10, 2
nd Edition, 1994 
51 David Palmeter, ‘The WTO as  Legal System’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 24, p. 444, 447 
(2000) [hereinafter Palmeter (2000)] 
52 Palmeter, 2000, p. 467 
53 Franck (1988), p. 754 Franck while looking for such ultimate rule did ask, “It is the nature of community, 
therefore, both to empower authority and to circumscribe it by an ultimate rule or set of rules of recognition 
that exists above, and itself is not circumscribed by, the system of normative authority. Does such a notion 
of community exist internationally, among states? Do nations recognize an ultimate rule or set of rules of 
recognition or process by which the legitimacy of all other international rules and procedures can be tested, 
a rule not itself to a higher normative test of its legitimacy, a rule that simply is, because it is accepted as 
font of the community’s collective self-definition?”, p. 754 
54 1988 I.C.J. REP. 12, 34, para. 57 (Advisory Opinion of 26th April, 1988). The observer Mission of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization was created by GA Res. 3237, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, UN   9 
In fact, Franck put the adherence as peremptory norms as described in Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties along with pacta sunt servanda, the good faith 
doctrine and the concept of primary and secondary rules as envisioned by Hart as 
important elements providing legitimacy to international treaty. State equality has been 
identified by Franck as an example of the ultimate rule of recognition.  
 
Ultimately, Franck concluded that, “It is therefore circumstantially demonstrable that 
there are obligations that states acknowledge to be necessary incidents of community 
membership. These are not perceived to obligate because they have been accepted by the 
individual state but, rather, are rules in which states acquiesce as part of their own 
validation; that is, as an inseparable aspect of “joining” a community of states that is 
defined by its ultimate secondary rules of process.”
55 
 
Franck used Dworkin’s term “associative obligations”
56 for secondary rules of 
recognition, which gets attached to all states because they are validated members of the 
international community. This is not consensual but is acquired by association. The true 
community has been defined by Dworkin where “the members accept that they are 
governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in political 
compromise…Members of a society of principle accept that their political rights and 
duties are not exhausted by the particular decisions their political institutions have 




Dworkin confirmed that what a community of principle, “does is to validate behavior in 
accordance with rules and applications of rules that confirm principled coherence and 
adherence, rather than acknowledging only power of power.”58 The problems in defining 
and delineating a cohesive community of states by the TRIPS Agreement impair the 








                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Doc. A/9631 (1974). The closure of the mission was required by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, title X of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. X, s. 1001, 101 Stat. 
1331, 1406 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. s 5201-5203 (West Supp. 1988) 
55 Franck (1988) p. 758. Franck further observed, “It is even possible to conclude that the members of the 
global community acknowledge  –for example-- each time they sign a treaty or recognize a new 
government—that statehood is incompatible with sovereignty. They acknowledge this because they must, 
so as to obtain and retain the advantages of belonging to an organized, sophisticated community, 
advantages only available if ultimate sovereignty resides in a set of rules of universal application. That is 
why states behave as if such rules existed and obligated” p. 758 
56 R. Dworkin, p. 196 
57 R. Dworkin, p. 211 
58 Franck (1988), p. 759   10 
Compliance with TRIPS 
 







64 among others have 
discussed in details the compliance of both developed and developing countries with 
TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Two aspects of TRIPS, one, that it imposes a wholly positive obligations as compared to 
negative obligations and the other, that it is an international agreement which tests the 
ability of international law to influence private actors through obligations imposed on the 
state, are relevant for compliance scholarships.  
 
Gerhart while discussing the ‘substantive validity’ that is “whether the obligation in 
question meets an articulated standard of welfare”
65 tried to distinguish it from Franck’s
66 
theory of legitimacy. According to Gerhart, “The literature of legitimacy looks at the 
process by which the international law is made and seeks to define the contours of 
processes that add to the moral weight and functional acceptability of international 
standards. The issue of substantive validity of a standard looks at the standard “on the 
merits” and asks whether the measure is, in fact merited”
67. However, Gerhart 
immediately suggests that compliance issues are closely intertwined with issues of the 
substantive validity of international obligations.  
 
Reichman appears to be of the view that the TRIPS Agreement is a revolutionary 
agreement where developed countries were able to impose  “a comprehensive set of 
intellectual property standards on the rest of the world. As ultimately enacted, these were 
not ‘minimum’ standards of intellectual property protection in the classical sense of the 
term; rather, they collectively expressed most of standards of protection on which the 
developed countries could agree among themselves.”
68 According to Reichman, however, 
the TRIPS standards are “likely to impose heavy social costs on most developing 
countries in the short and medium terms, if only because these countries will now have to 
                                                                   
59 Franck (1988), “…in a community organized around rules, compliance is secured –to whatever degree it 
is-at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed. Their legitimacy 
will vary in degree from rule to rule and time to time. It becomes a crucial factor, however, in the capacity 
of any rule to secure compliance when, as in the international system, there are no other compliance 
inducing mechanisms.” (p. 706) 
60 Jerome H. Reichman, 1998, ‘Securing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India’, Journal 
of International Economic Law (1998) p. 586-601 
61 Jerome H Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries’, 32 Case Western Res. Journal Of International Law,  p. 423-452 (2000) 
62 Peter M. Gerhart, ‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory – TRIPS as a Substantive Issue’, 32 Case 
Western Res. Journal of International Law, 393 (2000) 
63 Keith E. Maskus, (2000) Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, Case Western Reserve 
Journal Of International Law, Vol. 32, p. 471 
64 John E Giust,. 1997, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPS 
Working?, Indiana International Law and Comparative Law Review, vol. 8, p. 69-97 
65 Gerhart (2000) p. 361 
66 Thomas M. Franck, (1995), Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
67 Gerhart (2000) p. 362 
68 Reichman (1998)  p.586   11 
pay more in order to acquire the tools they need to overcome the technology gap.”
69 
Reichman appears to be advocating that imposition of the TRIPS Agreement was a 
justified act on the part of developed countries when he says that 
 
“…a relentless series of questionnaires emanating from the WTO has sought to focus 
the attention of the Council for TRIPS on the state of play in the different member 
countries. The developing countries have also been subjected to overt and covert 
pressures for early implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, although it seems fair to 
observe that such pressures are not necessarily inconsistent with the short transitional 




Both developed and developing countries have been found wanting in enacting TRIPS 
compliant legislation. Giust has given examples from Ireland, the UK, the USA, and 
Japan from the developed countries and India from developing countries to show that 
some of the provisions in these countries were not in agreement with TRIPS. However, 
while giving examples, Giust does not appear to have shown deep critical approach while 
examining the issue of non-compliance of these countries with the TRIPS Agreement. In 
case of Ireland and the UK, the presence of ‘local working was regarded as violative of 
Article 27.1 of TRIPS dealing with non-discrimination in enjoyability of patent rights 
with respect to technology, locally produced or imported and the place of inventions
71 
without realising that non-local working is an abuse of patent right under Article 5A(2) of 
the Paris Convention.  
 
This article examines the extent of non-compliance of developed countries with TRIPS 
and the impossibility of developing countries to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS 
because of indeterminate nature of TRIPS provisions and the continuous changes in the 
interpretations by the judicial and non-judicial institutions in the USA a nd other 
developed countries. In case of the USA, Giust has mentioned the 35 U.S.C. s. 102 (e) 
and Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as not complying with the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement.
72 Giust also discussed Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 
which permits US companies to file a complaint at the United States ITC against a 
foreign company for infringing US companies intellectual property rights. Section 337 
                                                                   
69 Reichman (1998)  p. 587. 
70 Reichman (1998)  p. 593 
71 Giust, (1997), pp. 86-87 
72 Giust, 1997, pp. 87-88, “Even though the US Patent laws were amended by the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA), the amendment left 35 U.S.C. 102(e) in place as interpreted in the two In re 
Hilmer decisions. In these decisions, the court held that a U.S. patent was available for prior art purposes, 
i.e. “filed” as of its U.S. filing date, but a U.S. patent based on a foreign Paris Convention application was 
not available for prior art purposes, i.e. was not “filed” as of its earlier international (Paris convention) 
filing date. This interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 102(e) has been criticized as incorrect and a violating national 
treatment in that equal treatment, for prior art purposes, is not given to U.S. patents based on foreign-filed 
patents. Despite the scholarly controversy, the United States has thus far successfully maintained that 35 
U.S.C.  102 (e) is consistent with its obligations of national treatment under the Paris Convention and 
GATT. Barring some further event or the raising of the current level of scrutiny, it is likely that  102 (e) 
will continue to walk border of compliance and non-compliance with the TRIPS national treatment 
requirements.”   12 
authorizes the ITC (International Trade Commission of the USA) to issue a general 
exclusion orders that would exclude the importation of products manufactured by non-
parties to the ITC investigation. In 1987, the European Economic Community requested a 
GATT dispute resolution with the United States. The GATT panel held that the United 
States did not afford national treatment to foreigners under Section 337.
73 Certain 
superficial changes were made to section 337 through the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Act (URAA)74 but in practice, Section 337 did not show much change.  
 
Similar developments took place in Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 of the 
USA. The Panel in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
75 ruled that 
Section 304 of the US Patent Act violated Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding
76. The Panel in United States 301-310 observed: 
  
“On this reading, the very discretion granted under Section 304, which under the US 
argument absolves the legislation, is what, in our eyes, creates the presumptive 
violation. The statutory language, which gives the USTR this discretion on its face, 
precludes the US from abiding by its obligations under the WTO. In each and every 
case when a determination is made whilst DSU proceedings are not yet exhausted.  
Members locked in a dispute with the United States will be subject to a mandatory 
determination by the USTR under a state which explicitly puts them in that very 
danger which Article 23 was intended to remove.”
77 
 
Some of the important compliance issues have been analyzed by Daya Shanker
78 in 
‘India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’ who expressed his doubt that 
the developing countries would ever be able to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS 
not only because of the text used in the TRIPS Agreement, but because of the attempt to 
continuously change the c ontours of TRIPS Agreement by judicial and non-judicial 
institutions in the developed countries which has made it nearly impossible for the 
developing countries to bring their Patent Acts in line with the obligations under TRIPS. 
Apart from non-compliance  by the USA mentioned by Giust, Daya Shanker
79 has 
mentioned the absence of the  requirement of invention in the US Patent Act which has 
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals in  State Street
80 while extending patenting to 
                                                                   
73 GATT Panel Report on United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1990, L/6439-36S/345, 1989 
GATTPD Lexis 2 (Nov. 7, 1989) (unpublished) 
74 URAA Title III, Subtitle C, 321 (amending Section 337)  
75 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc WT/DS152/R dated 22 December 
1999 
76 Annex 2 of The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts-
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter Understanding] 
77 WTO 1999, Panel Report in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R 
dated 22 December 1999 
78 Daya Shanker, India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS,  Working Paper, Department 
of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia (2001). The paper is available in SSRN Journals at 
SSRN_ID295384_code011231510.pdf [hereinafter Daya Shanker-India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the 
Validity of TRIPS (2001)] An edited version is forthcoming. 
79 Daya Shanker – ‘India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’ (2001) 
80 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Circuit. 1998)   13 
business methods, as a very crucial non-compliance of the TRIPS Agreement by a major 
proponent of TRIPS. Article 27.1 of TRIPS makes it clear makes that “Subject to the 
provisions of Article 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes in all fields of technology provided that they are new involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”  Note 5 of the TRIPS Agreement 
relating to Article 27.1 of TRIPS accommodates to some extent the position of the USA 
by deeming “inventive step” as ‘non-obvious’ and “capable of industrial application” as 
“useful” but the requirement for invention has not been waived by TRIPS Article 27.  
 
In fact, in the ‘Communication from the United States to the Negotiating Group on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods’ dated 11
th May 1990, the USA did not use the word invention.
81 The USA Patent 
Act is in breach of the TRIPS Agreement. Similarly Sections 204
82 and 209
83 of the US 
Patent Act requiring that the patents developed with the help of the US government 
finance has to be used for manufacturing the said patented product in the USA, is in 
violation of the non-discrimination stipulation of Article 27 which enjoins that there shall 
be no discrimination in enjoyability of patent rights regarding place of invention and 
whether products are imported or locally produced. Similarly, the Bolar Exemption
84 
giving extension to the patents for pharmaceutical products and which has been an issue 
in the dispute between Canada and the EC
85 would be violative of Article 30 of TRIPS in 
terms of the interpretation given by the Panel in its Report on Canada-Patent Protection
86. 
The extension of patents given to pharmaceutical products by the EC
87, Australia
88, 
                                                                   
81 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 dated 11 May 1990, Article 23 Patentable Subject Matter “Patents shall be 
granted for all products and processes, which are new, useful, and unobvious.” 
82 35 U.S.C.Sec. 204, “Preference for United States Industry: Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
chapter, no small business firm or nonprofit organization which receives title to any subject invention and 
no assignee of any such small business firm or nonprofit organization shall grant to any person the 
exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States unless such person agrees that any 
products embodying the subject invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will be 
manufactured substantially in the United States. However, in individual cases, the requirements for such an 
agreement can be waived by the Federal Agency under whose funding agreement the invention was made 
upon a showing by the small business firm, nonprofit organization, or assignee that reasonable but 
unsuccessful efforts have been made to grant licenses on similar terms to potential licensees that would be 
likely to manufacture substantially in the  United States or that under the circumstances domestic 
manufacture is not commercially feasible. 
83 Restriction on Licensing of Federally owned inventions (a) No Federal agency shall grant any license 
under a patent or patent application on a federally owned invention unless the person requesting the license 
has supplied the agency with a plan for development and/or marketing of the invention, except that any 
such plan may be treated by the Federal agency as commercial and financial information obtained from  a 
person and privileged and confidential and not subject to disclosure under section 552 of title 5 of the 
United States code. (b) A Federal agency shall normally grant the right to use or sell any federally owned 
invention in the United States only to a licensee that agrees that any products embodying the invention or 
produced through the use of the invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States. 
84 Bolar Exemption 35 U.S.C. 271 (e) 
85 Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R dated 
17.3.2000 [hereinafter Canada-Patent Protection] 
86 In the later part of this article, the incongruity of Canada-Pharmaceuticals with ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ has been discussed. 
87 Special Protection Certificate giving extension up to five years to pharmaceutical products   14 
Israel
89, Japan
90, and  the USA
91 are provisions violating the non-discrimination 
stipulation of Article 27.1 of TRIPS.  
 
One of the disconcerting parts of this development is that proposals for extension of 
patent period in situations invoking regulatory approval has been attempted to be 
introduced through the use of Dispute Settlement System of the WTO by both the USA
92 
and the EC93 apart from Switzerland and Austria after this proposal had not been agreed 
to in the final draft of the TRIPS Agreement. Similar provisions were part of the 
negotiations in NAFTA and are present in the Final Agreement.
94 
 
Another example is the removal of ‘local working’ from the UK Patent Act and the 
European Patent Convention as late as 29
th July 1999. Before the amendment of the UK 
Patent Act in July 1999, the ’local working’ provisions in Section 48(3) in the UK Patent 
Act read as 
 
“(a) Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the United 
Kingdom, that it is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable; 
(b) Where the patented invention is a product, that a demand for the product in the United 
Kingdom- 
(i)  is being met to a substantial extent by importation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
88 The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 1998 amended the Australian Patents Act 1990 to give 
effect to the government’s decision to provide for an extension of term scheme for pharmaceutical patents. 
The amendments entered into force on 27
th January 1999 and provide that an extension of up to five years 
will be available for a standard patent relating to a pharmaceutical subsistence that is the subject of first 
inclusion on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods. The scheme will apply to all existing 20 years 
patents, as well as those patents granted after the commencement date –Extracts from the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 1998. 
89 Israel Patent Act permits permission of extension 
90 Section 67(2) of the Japanese Patent Act: The term of the Patent right may be extended, upon application 
for registration of an extension, by a period not exceeding five years if, because of the necessity of 
obtaining an approval or other disposition which is governed by provisions in laws intended to ensure 
safety, etc. in the working of the patented inventions, and which is provided for in the Cabinet order being 
such that, in view of the object of the relevant disposition, proceedings, etc., a considerable period of time 
is required for the proper action for the disposition, it was not possible to work the patented invention for 
two years. 
91 35 U.S.C.  s. 156 
92 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 dated 11
th May 1990, Article 25 Term of Protection “The term of protection 
shall be at least 20 years from the date of filing of the application. Contracting parties are encouraged to 
extend the term of patent protection, in appropriate cases, to compensate for delays caused by regulatory 
approval processes. 
93 MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 dated 29
th March 1990, Article 25 Term of Protection “The term of protection 
made available shall be at least 20 years from the date of filling of the application. Contracting parties are 
encouraged to extend the term of patent protection, in appropriate cases, to compensate for delays by 
regulatory approval processes. 
94 Article 1709(12) of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, which was similarly based on the 
Dunkel Text, expressly says 
“Each party shall provide a term of protection for patents of alt least 20 years from the date of filing or 17 
years from the date of grant. A party may extend t term of patent protection, in appropriate cases, to 
compensate for delays caused by regulatory approval.”   15 
(c) Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the United 
Kingdom, that it is being prevented or hindered from being so worked- 
(i)  where the invention is a product, by the importation of the product” 
 
The UK High court (Chancery Division-Pates Court) justified the provision in Extrude 
Hone v. Heathway Machine Sales
95 by observing 
 
“The grant of a compulsory license is plainly not in terms a qualitative restriction. Nor 
is it, in my view, a measure having equivalent effect. It is, however, calculated to 
encourage competition and is entirely in accord with the general concept of the Treaty 
[Treaty of Rome]” 
 
This provision stayed in the UK Patent Act till 29
th July 1999 in spite of adverse 
comment by the European court of Justice in Smith-Kline and French Laboratories v. 
Generics
96. The provision was compatible with Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention
97 
which through incorporation in the TRIPS Agreement vide Article 2.1 and Article 2.2 
became an integral part of the WTO
98 and as per Article 2.2 of TRIPS, the provisions of 
Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention cannot be affected by another provision in Parts I 
to IV of the TRIPS Agreement.
99 A provision which was perfectly compatible with the 
TRIPS Agreement was modified after more than four years ostensibly to bring it into line 
with the TRIPS obligations through The Patents and Trade Marks (World Trade 
Organization) Regulation 1999. As per the EC in Canada-Patent Protection, Article 63 
does not permit presence of non-compatible provisions in the developed countries’ Patent 
Acts such as the United Kingdom’s after 1
st January 1996. Further developments such as 
the United States move against Brazil in the WTO clearly indicate that the purpose of this 
                                                                   
95 Extrude Hone v. Heathway Machine Sales,[1981] 3 CMLR 379 at 404-5 
96 Smith-Kline and French Laboratories v. Generics, [1990] 1 CMLR 416,  [1990] RPC 203 
97 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockton, 
July 14, 1967, 25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] 
98 WTO 2002, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS176/AB/R dated 7.1. 2002, paras 124 and 125. It says 
“Para 124: Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “[I]n respect of Parts II, III and IV of this 
Agreement, Members shall comply with Article 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris convention 
(1967).” Thus Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention (1967), have been incorporated by references into 
the TRIPS Agreement and thus, the WTO Agreement. 
Para 125: Consequently, WTO Members, whether they are countries of the Paris Union or not, are obliged, 
under the WTO Agreement, to implement those provisions of the Paris Convention (1967) that are 
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. AS we have already stated, Article 6quinquies of the Paris 
Convention (1967) is one such provision.” 
99 Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement says “Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from 
existing obligations that members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne 
Convention, the Rome convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in respect of Integrated Circuits”. 
Daya Shanker in ‘Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO’ analyzed the  compatibility of ‘local 
working’ in connection with the US complaint against Brazil regarding the presence of ‘local working’ in 
Brazil’s Patent Act. He has also analyzed presence of ‘local working’ in proposed Indian 2
nd Amendment  
Bill, 1999  to bring the Indian Patent Act in line with the TRIPS obligations in ‘India, Pharmaceutical 
Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’.   16 
amendment was to bring changes in the TRIPS Agreement which the parties didn’t arrive 
at during the Uruguay Round negotiations
100.   
 
 
Comparative Legitimacy of TRIPS Agreement 
 
Indeterminacy and TRIPS 
Reichman
101 is of the view that the TRIPS Agreement is largely indeterminate i.e. the 
TRIPS Agreement contains standards which are neither clear nor unambiguous and the 
language is undefined. Gerhart
102 even suggests that the Panel Report in Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents
103 allowing imitators to manufacture patented 
products before expiry of the patent term also introduced indeterminacy. Gerhart
104found 
that the Article 27 provision that a country must grant patents to inventions that are “new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” is ambiguous as none 
of these terms were defined nor were meanings completely harmonized.  
 
Gerhart wondered whether their meanings would be attempted to be derived by blending 
the various concepts from state patent statutes or how far a particular state may deviate 
from the normal meaning of these terms and still stay in conformity with the TRIPS. 
Reichman also questioned the role of exceptions in patenting and copyright and Article 6 
of TRIPS which permits different regimes in exhaustion of patent rights. The freedom of 
use of tax and competition policy to restrict intellectual property rights also leaves states 
free to impair the rights.  However, the majority of the points raised by Reichman are 
pertaining to looking at indeterminacy from the point of view of industry associations 
such as PhRMA in developed countries.  The question of indeterminacy has been dealt 
with by Daya Shanker in his article “India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of 
TRIPS”
105 where he has analyzed indeterminacy  in its various forms such as uncertainty, 
vagueness and malleability.  
 
The major indeterminacy comes from the text of the TRIPS Agreement itself. A badly 
worded Article 1.1 saying that “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in 
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that 
such protection doesn’t contravene the provisions of this Agreement’ initiates the 
indeterminacy leaving practically no control over such extensions of protection except 
                                                                   
100 Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United 
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/3 dated 9
th January. Daya Shanker, ’Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and 
the WTO’ 5 The Journal of World Intellectual Property January No. 1 (2002) has discussed this issue in 
detail. 
101 Reichman (2000), 439 
102 Gerhart, 2000, n. 59, p. 380 “Even here, ambiguity is present. SEE Canada-Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, Report of the Panel (March 17, 2000) (indicating that the TRIPS 
obligation to have a twenty year patent term is not violated by allowing imitators to manufacture the drug 
and apply for regulatory approval before the twenty years is up, but that obligation is violated by allowing 
imitators to stockpile generic drugs for sale after the twenty year period is over) 
103 Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R 
dated 17
th March 2000 
104 Gerhart 2000, p. 380 
105 Daya Shanker ‘India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the validity of TRIPS’ (2001)   17 
Article 27.1 stipulating no discrimination between any field of technology, place of 
invention and whether products are imported or locally produced. However, even this 
interpretation has been questioned by the EC when in  Canada-Patent Protection, it 
insisted that the non-discrimination clause is not applicable to the extensions of 
protection
106. Every extension of protection is bound to increase the trade protection 
particularly for patented products which specifically bans import of the patented products 
through inclusion of word ‘import’ in Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement.  This is 
followed by Article 6 of the TRIPS introduced at the instance of developed countries
107 
permitting bans on parallel imports by individual countries or regional groups such as the 
EC against the international commercial norms of exhaustion of rights on sale.   
 
Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS use the term “Members may” regarding exclusion of 
“inventions to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice 
to the environment”
108 and “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatment of 
human or animals” but “may” can be argued as “shall” in certain circumstances but 
following the textual approach “may” permits all the subject matter mentioned in Articles 
27.2 and 27.3 to be patentable subject matter. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing 
with terms of protection is similarly worded. It permits unlimited protection when it says 
“The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty 
years from the filing date” which permits no fixed term of protection and a patent may be 
extended for any period with its monopolistic rent seeking consequences as happened in 
the case of pharmaceutical products and extension of copyright period in the USA. 
 
Reichman’s
109 indeterminacy conception of TRIPS was mostly confined to exceptions 
under Article 30 and 31 of the TRIPS. Exceptions normally don’t introduce 
indeterminacy but the permission to extend protection without any limit in terms of 
patentability of the subject matter and unlimited extension of term of patents 
fundamentally changes the concept of TRIPS and raises questions about its validity. . 
Even the smallest increase in the term of protection is an increase in the trade 
protectionism, a concept totally antithetical to the free trade and the Most Favored Nation 
Treatment on the basis of which the whole of WTO structure was erected.   
 
Franck has also discussed the introduction of indeterminacy in a treaty through the 
“inconsistent state conduct”. The concept of “inconsistent state conduct” has been 
analyzed by Daya Shanker
110. In brief, the extension of patenting to ‘Business Methods’ 
and ‘computer programs’ on the basis of a flawed interpretation of superior judicial 
decisions, the direction by the European Patent Office to change the term computer 
programs into computer inventions, removal of ‘local working’ from the UK Patent Act 
through the introduction of  The Patents and Trade Marks (World Trade Organization) 
Regulations 1999 in the UK Patent Act are some of the examples where the “inconsistent 
state conduct” has introduced indeterminacy in the TRIPS Agreement. 
                                                                   
106 Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel WTO Doc.  WT/DS114/R 
dated 17
th March 2000, Note 146 
107 Trips and Pharmaceutical Patents, Fact Sheet, WTO OMC, April 2001 
108 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.2 and 27.3 
109 Reichman, 2000, p. 439 
110 Daya Shanker, ‘India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’, (2001)   18 
Process Determinacy and DSU 
 
The Panel in  United States Sections 301-310 was quite categorical in stating the 
importance of determinacy when it observed 
 
“What are the objects and purposes of the DSU
111, and the WTO more generally, that 
are relevant to a construction of Article 23? The most relevant in our view are those 
which relate to the creation of market conditions conducive to individual economic 




Article 3.2 of the DSU is one of the main instruments, which has aptly described the 




The Panel in United States Sections 301-310 observed that after creation of free market 
conditions, the central element of the WTO was to provide “security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system”
114 A large number of Appellate Body decisions such as 
the Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages
115. 
 
No doubt the Panel is to follow the judicial economy but at the same time “the basic aim 
of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes… we do not consider that Article 
3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to make law by 
clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a 
particular dispute. As panel need only to consider those claims which must be addressed 
in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.”116  
 
                                                                   
111 Annex 2 – Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of Legal Text 
[hereinafter DSU] 
112 United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R dated 22 December 
1999, p. 320-321 [hereinafter United States 301 – 310] 
113 Article 3.2 of the DSU provides 
“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system. The members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations 
of Members under the covered agreements…” 
114 The Panel in United States 301-310 observed “Providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving 
the broad objective of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important 
instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of 
the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this 
object and purpose and in a manner, which would most effectively enhance it. In this respect we are 
referring not only to preambular language but also to positive law provisions in the DSU itself.” p.321 
115 Japanese Alcoholic Beverages, WT/AB…, “WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. 
WT rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the 
endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the 
multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind. In that way, we will achieve the 
‘security and predictability’ sought for the multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through 
the establishment of the dispute settlement system” p. 31 
116 WT/DS33/AB/R of 25
th April 1997   19 
Similarly in I ndia-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products
117, where the Appellate Body observed, “India is obliged, by Article 70.8(a), to 
provide a legal mechanism for the filing of mailbox applications that provides a sound 
legal basis t o preserve both the novelty of the inventions and the priority of the 
applications as of the relevant filing and priority dates”. There are a number of other 
Panel and GATT Reports also which recognize importance of security and predictability  
as an object and purpose of the Dispute Settlement System and the WTO118 
 
However, in spite of the fact that the dispute settlement system is supposed to provide 
“security and predictability” to the multilateral trading system, in this case the TRIPS 
Agreement, as consistently maintained by the Appellate bodies and the Panel Reports, the 
constitution and the performances of the Dispute Settlement Bodies such as the Panels 
and the Appellate Bodies do not inspire much confidence in their ability to introduce 
certainty and predictability. Franck has maintained that the bodies responsible for process 
determinacy themselves should have the character of being legitimate. The constitution of 
the Panel lacks the most vital element that its members should have judicial competence 
or judicial experience. Article 8 of the DSU
119 dealing with ‘Composition of Panels’ says 
“Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental or non-governmental 
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served 
as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a 
representative to the Council  or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor 
agreement or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, 
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.” 
 
Not even one group mentioned in Article 8 of the Understanding is supposed to have a 
judicial experience or judicial competence and the overall emphasis is essentially on the 
trade officials who h ave participated in the negotiations. The concept of unbiased non-
partisanship approach, a primary requirement for members of any institution given the 
responsibility of interpreting a law in case of conflict between the nations is an 
anachronism to the groups qualified to become members of a Panel in Dispute Settlement 
System of the WTO. The governmental officials who appear to form  the backbone of the 
DSU Panel invariably suffer from certain biases, a sense of insecurity and the ignorance 
of judicial approach. 
 
Non-transparency in the dispute settlement proceedings is another crucial issue. Prof. 
Bhala while discussing the role of ‘stare decisis’ in the WTO adjudication observed that, 
‘The fact that public cannot attend oral arguments, that submissions must be kept secret, 
                                                                   
117 India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/ DS50/AB/R dated 19
th December 
1997, para. 58 
118 WTO Panel Report on Argentina- Textiles and Apparel (US), op. Cit., para. 6.29 and the GATT Panel 
Reports on United States Manufacturing Clause, adopted 15/16 May 1984, BISD 31S/74, para. 39; Japan – 
Measures on Imports of Leather (“Japan – Leather”), adopted 15/16 May 1984, BISD31S/94, para. 55; 
EEC – Imports of Newsprint, adopted November 20 1984, BISD 31S/114, para. 52; Norway – Restrictions 
on Imports of Apples and Pears, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/306, para. 5.6 
119 Annex 2 – Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of Legal Text   20 
and that they would not be accepted at all from NGOs or individuals is harder to justify to 
the Anglo-American legal mind’
120.   
 
An examination of the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports dealing with TRIPS 
conflicts  show that the performance of the Panels and the Appellate Bodies has not been 
appropriate and at times, the Panel Reports and the Appellate Body reports have added 
more to the unpredictability and uncertainty already present in the text of TRIPS through 
injudicious, incoherent and at times contradictory decisions. 
 
The important Panel and Appellate Body Reports dealing with TRIPS issues are India-
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products
121, Canada – 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
122, United States – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998
123, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act
124 
and a Panel Report in United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
125 which 
is related to the ‘Special 301’ with the ostensible purpose of threatening the countries 
with unilateral action by the USA although that country may not be violating any of the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. There are two more Panel reports dealing with 
TRIPS issues, one is  Canada-Term of Protection
126  and another  Indonesian 
Automobile
127 with some argument pertaining to TRIPS. This article will mostly be 
dealing with the reports pertaining to patent provisions as they are some of the most 
controversial reports with a wide repercussions. United States – Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act 
128is of little consequence in terms of  its  impact although the interest of  
the Irish Rights Performing Organization against this provision of the US Copyright Law, 
on whose behalf the EC initiated the dispute resolution proceedings  against the US 
exceptions can be questionable. 
 
In India-Patent Protection
129, the issue was a minor one dealing with establishment of a 
mechanism under Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement “by which application for patents 
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Doc. WT/DS 176/AB/R January 2002 
124 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R 
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th June 2000 
129 For the purpose of this article, the analysis is confined to Appellate Body Report where it is available.   21 
for such inventions (pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical) can be filed” to preserve 
novelty of the inventions and the priority of the applications as of the relevant filing and 
priority dates. Any action on these application is to be taken only after 1 January 2005.   
India issued “administrative instructions” for this purpose which has been labeled as 
‘mail box’ system. The Panel and the Appellate Body in this dispute found that   because 
the Indian Patent Act had certain provisions which were not required to be changed till 1
st 
January 2005, these provisions may undermine “the administrative instructions” and 
would not provide a “sound legal basis”
130. The sections of the Indian Patent Act found 
offensive by the Panel and the Appellate Body were  
 
(a) substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicines or drug 
are not patentable 
(b) When the complete specification has been led in respect of an application for a patent, 
section 12(1) of the Indian Patent Act requires the Controller to refer that application 
and that specification to an examiner 
(c) Section 15(2) of the Indian Patent Act states that the Controller “shall refuse” an 
application in respect of substance that is not patentable. 
 
None of these provisions were required to be changed and all that was required was “to 
provide a means” essentially to get the priority date. It is never required that it has to be 
“sound legal basis” and that this “sound legal basis”
131 can come only from the Indian 
Parliament.  
 
However, subsequent examination of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in United 
States – Sections 301-310
132 and United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act 
of 1998 suggests a different approach.   
 
In United States – 301-310, the Panel after observing that, “The risk of a unilateral 
determination of inconsistency as found in the statutory language of Section 304 itself 
has an equally apparent “chilling effect” on both members and the market-place even if is 
not quite certain that such a determination would be made” found Section 304 
inconsistent with Article 23.  
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131 Ibid, paras 59, 70 and 71 
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   22 
However, the Panel after concluding that the “statutory language of Section 304 
constitute a serious threat that determinations contrary to Article 23.2(a) may be taken 
and in the circumstances of this case, is prima facie inconsistent with Article 23.2(a) read 
in the light in of Article 23.1” concluded “that this threat had been removed by the 
aggregate effect of the SAA (Statement of Administrative Action) and the US statements 
before this Panel in a way that also removes the prima facie inconsistency  and fulfils the 
guarantees incumbent on the US under Article 23.”133 
 
This acceptance of the US Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) which 
accompanied the US legislation implementing the results of the Uruguay Round 
submitted by the President to the US Congress did not suggest need for ‘sound legal 
basis’. The Statement of Administrative Action was accepted in spite of Section 102(a) of 
the US Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994 says that 
 
“(1) UNITTED STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN CONFLICT. – No provision in any of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person 
or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect. 
(2) CONSTRUCTION. – Nothing in this Act shall be construed -… 
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States, including 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 unless specifically provided for in this Act”. 
 
It is difficult to reconcile this part of the US Uruguay Round Act with ‘sound legal basis’ 
provided by Statement of Administrative Action regarded consistency of Sections 301-
310 with the provisions of the WTO particularly when the Panel  found them prima facie 
inconsistent.  
 
In fact, President’s Statement of Administrative Action also said that “other areas of 
United States Intellectual property law are unaffected by the Agreement on TRIPS. For 
example, the Agreement does not require any change in current United States law or 
practice with respect the parallel importation of goods that are the subject of intellectual 
property rights.”
134 It did not prevent the USA from disputing Brazil’s parallel import 
provision, which is similar to US practice before the WTO
135. 
 
Similar ambiguities from the Dispute Settlement Bodies’ decisions have been noticed in 
United States  – Section 211 where Section 211[a](2) saying “No U.S. court shall 
recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of rights by a designated national 
based on common law rights or registration obtained  under such section 515.527 of such 
a confiscated mark, trade name, or commercial name.” 
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The Appellate Body in this case observed, “Civil judicial procedures  would not be fair 
and equitable if access to courts were not given to both complainants and defendants who 
purport to be owners of an intellectual property right.”
137  
 
Notwithstanding the text of the law of Section 211[a](2) and 211[b] expressly prohibiting 
access of courts to designated national, the Panel and the Appellate Body accepted the 
assertion of the US representative that  the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence would be available and “after applying the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, that an enforcement proceedings has 
failed to establish ownership – a requirement of substantive law – with the result that it is 
impossible for the court to rule in favor of that claimant’s or that defendant’s claim to a 
trademark right, does not constitute a violation of Article 42.”
138  
 
The net meaning of such interpretation by the Appellate Body would be that Sections 
211(a)(2) and (b) are superfluous sections as people who do not have ownership of the 
intellectual property prima facie do not have a right to move the court. Alternatively, the 
provisions of Sections 211(a)(2) and (b) expressly prohibit designated nationals access to 
the court. Whatever the interpretation, the “sound legal basis” does not appear to be 
present anywhere in this case.  
 
The last relevant Panel Report with very wide repercussions is that of Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
139 which has been analyzed by Daya Shanker
140 
in a number of his articles in view of the excessive constructionism indulged in by the 
Panel in concluding that Article 27.1 would be applicable to Article 30 dealing with 
exceptions in the TRIPS Agreement. The analysis of this Panel Report suggests that the 
arguments of the parties and the conclusion of the Panel ignored the ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ as developed  and applied by various Appellate 
Bodies of the DSU and the main finding of application of Article 27.1 to exception under 
Article 30 was based on Canada’s acknowledged point that Article 27.1 would be 
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applicable to Article 31 and not on uninterested examination of facts and rules.
141 The 
argument of the EC and the acceptance of this argument by the Panel that objective under 
Article 7 and purpose under Article 8, do not have any role in the interpretation led the 
Council of Ministers at Doha to resort to Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement for the 
first time since the formation of the WTO to give the interpretation that  
 
“In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreements as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.”
142   
 
The Panel while accepting the consistency of Canada’s Section 55.2(1) of its Patent Act 
with Article 30 of TRIPS relied on the representations of Canada that products 
manufactured during the 6 months period would not be sold for profit.
143 Similar 
acceptance of the Panel’s report has been made by  the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 
where the Panel accepted the representations of the USA as to the manner in which the 
United States would interpret  the measure at issue. However, similar consideration was 
not shown to India, in India – Patent Protection where the panel, as upheld by the 
Appellate Body, refused to accept representations made by the Indian Government as to 
the operation of its patent system and commitments/pledges by the Indian government 
that it would implement its system in conformity with its WTO obligations.  
 
Weiler while discussing the legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
questioned the extraordinary influence of the WTO Secretariat on the Panel and 
Appellate Body Reports in view of the judicial inexperience of the Panel and Appellate 
Body members although he was kind to the performance of the Appellate Bodies.
144  
 
Thus the composition of the Panel and the Appellate Bodies, the incoherent approach 
adopted by the Panels which at times can be called discriminatory approach and ignoring 
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law suggest that the present 
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system of dispute settlement has not been very successful in introducing determinacy in 





The two forms of symbolic validation envisaged by Franck are “ritual” and “pedigree”. 
As already discussed, ritual does not present relevant issue for discussion in this Article, 
but the concept of pedigree as developed by Franck is a very relevant question for this 
analysis. The  historical origin and deeprootedness of any treaty along with the 
codification practice followed by the International Law Commission (ILC) and the 
unanimous decisions of the International Court of Justice improves the compliance pull 
of an international treaty.  However, Franck did not restrict “pedigree” as merely a matter 
of hereditary lineage but considered it in the light of a broader concept to the extent the 
person or institution responsible for the rule is perceived as “deserving to be obeyed” or 




146 has quite repeatedly called the TRIPS Agreement “revolutionary”, 
the Agreement does not appear to be characterized by deeprootedness or the 
circumstances in which the TRIPS Agreement was prepared or adopted was perceived to 
be “deserving to be obeyed.” An analysis of the circumstances leading to the finalization 
of the TRIPS would bring out the relevant context of the circumstances in which the 
TRIPS Agreement was finalized. Trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
including trade in Counterfeiting Goods was introduced in the Ministerial Declaration of 
20
th  September 1986. The negotiating objectives were stated as follows: 
 
“In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights don’t themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations 




In spite of the pressure from the developed countries, the negotiations on TRIPS did not 
proceed until the Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal in December 1988 where they 
decided that Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) should meet in Geneva during the 
first week of April 1989 to continue discussions where the following clarifications were 
made concerning TRIPS: 
 
“Ministers agree that negotiations on this subject shall continue in the Uruguay Round 
and shall encompass the following issues: 
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(a)  The applicability of the basic principles of the GATT and of relevant 
international intellectual property agreements or conventions; 
(b)  The provision of adequate s tandards and principles concerning the 
availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights; 
(c)  The provision  of effective  and appropriate means for the enforcement of 
trade –related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in 
national legal systems; 
(d)  The provision of effective and expeditious procedures for the multilateral 
prevention and settlement of disputes between governments, including the 
applicability of GAT T procedures; and  
(e)  Transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in the results of 
the negotiations.  
 
Ministers agreed that in the negotiations consideration will be given to concerns raised 
by participants related to underlying public policy objectives of their national systems 




By March 1990, the strategy of developed countries changed and a series of draft legal 
texts starting from the EC
149, followed by the USA
150 and ending with the ‘Group of 
14’
151 were submitted. An examination of the GATT documents during the period 
suggests that countries like Brazil, India, Thailand and Taiwan opposing the inclusion of 
TRIPS as a whole and subsequently various provisions were brought in line by the action 
of the United States under Special 301 although many scholars tend to suggest that the 
use of  Special 301 were accompanied with concession in other fields like textiles and 
agriculture. On 20th December, 1991 using ‘5+5’ and ‘10+10’ meetings, the TRIPS 
Agreement was finalized from where majority of the recommendations of the developing 
countries had been removed or circumscribed.
152 Introduction of trade secrets and the 
obligations in Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement to comply with the major intellectual 
property conventions contrary to accepted principles of international law were 
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Coercion and Validity of TRIPS 
 
In TNT.GNGTRIPS/1
154, one of the participants expressed grave concerns about the 
‘Special 30’ provisions of the existing United states Trade Law, which empowered the 
United States Trade Representative to take unilateral retaliatory actions against 
“offending” countries, enacted during the TRIPS negotiations and suggested that the 
nomination of “priority foreign countries” was in itself a violation of the commitments 
under the Punta del Este Declaration on standstill and rollback, which required 
participants not to take any measures that would have improved their negotiating 
positions. The complaint was that ‘the implementation of the United States Trade Law 
against other countries, either at the stage of merely identifying priority countries or of 
actual retaliation, would surely improve or strengthen the positions of the United States 
and weaken the position of other countries. (para. 5) 
 
This concern was supported by other countries, one of whom said that in spite of the 
quick pace and positive attitude his country had shown in respect of the protection of 
IPRs, it had been identified as one of the  “Special 301” priority foreign countries. A 
large number of countries expressed this concern that “Special 301” provisions was being 
taken “in order to create pressure on countries to change their negotiating positions,”
155.  
 
In 1984, the US Trade Act of 1974 underwent significant change with the authorization 
to USTR to take action against the countries without a showing of injury if they do not 
give adequate intellectual protection as per the US requirement.
156 After undergoing a 
number of amendments
157, the most important amendment was made during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, called 
Special 301158 which gave a unilateral power to the USTR to identify foreign states 
denying intellectual property protection to the United States firms as per the allegations 
of the US industry and to designate them as different categories of culprits.   
 
Once a country is designated as a “priority foreign country”, the USTR would have to 
initiate an investigation within thirty days to determine whether foreign practices violated 
the United States requirements on intellectual property or were unreasonable or 
discriminatory.159 The enhancement of the authority of the USTR laid enabled it to single 
countries opposed to the TRIPS agreement for punitive action. The countries identified 
on this list in 1989, immediately after the ‘Special 301’ was passed were India, Brazil, 
Taiwan, and Thailand i.e. all the major countries which opposed inclusions of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Uruguay Round and were objecting to various provisions in the 
TRIPS which in certain respect were far more restrictive than the then existing provisions 
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in the developed countries. Gathii 
160 was quite emphatic that the TRIPS Agreement came 
about in its present form only because of the use of ‘Special 301’, which threatened the 
negotiating parties to punitive actions in case of opposition.
161   
 
Brazil’s Ambassador, Celso Amorium raised this issue in the GATT Council in May 
1993 that,” By threatening to make use of unilateral trade measures, the US Government 
reinforces doubts the international community has as to the sincerity of the US 
commitments to the multilateral trade rules, as embodied in the GATT, as well as to the 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round.”
162  
 
Prohibition of the use of force in international treaty obligations has been accepted by 
practically all the countries of the world including the USA. The most important one is 
acceptance of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in the declaration on 
principles  governing the mutual relations of States participating in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1 August 1975), whereby the 
“participating States undertake to “refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their 
international relations in general, “from the threat or use of force”
163. The International 
Court of Justice
164 observed that, “Acceptance of a text in these terms confirms the 
existence of an  opinio juris of the participating States prohibiting the  use of force in 
international relations.” 
 
The International Court of Justice
165 made a very categorical observation regarding 
prohibition of use of force when it observed 
 
“A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law of the principle 
of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred to 
in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of such law. The 
International Law Commission, in the course of its work on the codification of the law 
of treaties, expressed the view that “the law of the Charter concerning the prohibitions 
of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international 
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law having the character of jus cogens” (paragraph (1) of the commentary of the 
Commission to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 
1966-II, p. 247). Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits submitted in the present case 
states that the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph 
4, of the Charter of the United Nations “has come to be recognized as jus cogens”.  
The United States, in its Counter-memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, found it material to quote the views of scholars that this principle is a 
“universal norm”, a “universal international law”, a “universally recognized principle 
of international law”, a “principle of jus cogens”. 
 
Templeman was categorical about use of coercion in the formation of the TRIPS 
Agreement when he observed “All the increases of patent and copyright protection were 
obtained by powerful lobbies persuading individual governments to take action and then 
persuading all others t o “harmonize” their legislation, thus obtaining worldwide 
monopolies. There appears to be no public interest justification for the increases in 
copyright protection; the extensions were not necessary to encourage authors. The excuse 
for increases in patent protection are said to be the delay in the testing of pharmaceutical 
and similar products for health and safety reasons after application has been made for a 
patent.” 
166 Templeman further says, “The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (The ‘TRIPS Agreement’) was obtained by the threat and 
reality of trade sanctions and the withdrawal of aid. The TRIPS Agreement is now being 
enforced by similar methods.”
167  
 
As against mutual benefit of opening of the borders for free trade, the TRIPS “responded 
only to the interests of the industrialized countries that would be the principal exporters  
of intellectual property” 168.  
 
Gerhart observed that once the USA decided to include intellectual property in the 
Uruguay Round with the help of other developed countries
169, the USA took away the 
option of status quo i.e. the option to have no negotiations by insisting that if the 
countries did not adopt intellectual property standards they would be left in a worse 
situation.
170 In notes 28 and 30, Gerhart made it clear that the developing countries were 
left with no choice and had to accept the TRIPS Agreement. Section 301 was used to 
exert significant pressure on target countries  and the developing countries were forced to 
relent. The coercion story shows the underbelly of TRIPS that treaties are consensual and 
getting an independent arbiter of substantial validity  is quite difficult. The fact that 
TRIPS is not resulted from real consent, does undermine the legitimacy of the TRIPS 
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Agreement.  It appears that the developing countries went along “not to make themselves 
better off but to avoid being made worse off”
171 
 
The threat and coercion was discussed in detail by the EC and the Panel in United States 
– Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.
172 The EC while describing the effect of 
Sections 301- 310 of the US Trade Act stated 
 
“The European Communities maintains that in particular, the constant threat of 
imposition of unilateral measures has an influence on the behavior and the decisions of 
the economic operators. In practice, the fact of the filing of a petition or the simple 
publication of a notice in the Federal Register announcing the initiation of an 
investigation, within the concrete context of the provisions contained in Sections 301-
310 and the publicly known interpretation given by the US Administration and the 
Congress created “chilling” trade effects that may range from the slowing down of 
importation of products to the more radical stoppage of any bilateral trade with the 
United States in those products.” 
 
This observation of the EC was accepted by the Panel in United States-Section 301-310 
where the Panel made observations as follows: 
 
“When a Member imposes unilateral measures in violation of Article 23 in a specific 
dispute, serious damage is created both to other Members and the market place. 
However, in our view, the creation of damage is not confined to actual conduct in 
specific cases. A law reserving the right for unilateral measures to be taken contrary to 
DSU rules and procedures, may – as is the case here- constitute an ongoing threat and 
produce a “chilling effect” causing serious damage in a variety of ways.”173  
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172 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R dated 22 
December 1999, para 4.45 
173 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R dated 22 
December 1999, para. 7.88. IN subsequent paras. The Panel has discussed the types of damages. In para 
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This was followed by further observation by the Panel of incompatibility of unilateral action with 
provisions of WTO. It observed  
“Second there is the damage cased to the market place itself. The mere fact of having legislation the 
statutory language of which permits conduct which is WTO prohibited  – namely, the imposi tion of 
unilateral measures against other members with which it is locked in a trade dispute – may in and of itself 
prompt economic operators to change their commercial behavior in a way that distorts trade. Economic 
operators may be afraid, say to continue ongoing trade with, or investment in, the industries or products 
threatened by unilateral measures. Existing trade may also be distorted because economic operators may 
feel a need to take out extra insurance to allow of rte illegal possibility that the legislation contemplates,   31 
The Panel in  United States- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 made a final 
observations regarding unilateral action that  
 
“Our textual observation of Article 23.2(a) is thus confirmed when taking account also 
of the other elements referred to in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Under this 
reading the duty of members under Article 23 to have recourse to and abide by the 
rules and procedures of the DSU and to abstain from unilateral determinations of 
inconsistency, is meant to guarantee Members as well as the market-place and those 
who operate in it that no such determination in respect of WTO rights and obligations 
will be made.” 
 
In spite of the Panel’s observations, the Fact Sheet released by the USTR regarding 
Special “301”
174 which is not different from Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974 and was 
amended vide the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to bring it in conformity with the 
WTO says that “a country can be found to deny adequate and effective intellectual 
property protection even if it is in compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.” 
 
The use of coercion, however, minor role it may have played in  the formation of the 
TRIPS Agreement would not make it easy for the Members to perceive this international 





One of the fundamental aspects of legitimacy of international rules is a presumption 
against arbitrariness between rights and duties of different states or governments. A 
major argument developed by Franck to have coherence in a rule of international law is 
to provide connection not only with specific principles but also with general principles (a 
“lattice of principles”) used to solve a variety of other problems. 
 
In discussing the determinacy of the TRIPS, two of the arguments forwarded were that 
TRIPS while providing extraordinary power to patent holders of developed countries to 
extend the temporary and limited monopoly at the same time insisting that non-
discriminatory provisions of the TRIPS would not be applicable to such extension
175 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
thus reducing the relative competitive opportunity of their products on the market. Other operators may be 
deterred from trading with such Member altogether, distorting potential trade. The damage thus caused to 
the market-place may actually increase when national legislation empowers individual economic operators 
to trigger unilateral State action, as is the case in the US which allows individual petitioners to request the 
USTR to initiate an investigation under Sections 301-310.  This in itself is not illegal. But the ability 
conferred upon economic operators to relationship and deny certain commercial advantages that foreign 
competitors would otherwise have. The threat of unilateral action can be as damaging on the market –place 
as the action itself.”   
174 USTR 2000 Special 301 Report: The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights released on May 1 2000 
175 Argument of the EC, in Canada Patent Protection and indirect application of such argument by the 
Panel. Note.    32 
questions the presence of equality in an international treaty which makes it attractive for 
compliance.      
 
Similarly, provisions of TRIPS in Article 27 permitting patenting of all the inventions 
notwithstanding that all the countries including major proponents of TRIPS had 
specifically excluded scientific theories, mathematical methods, discoveries and materials 
or substances, abstract ideas, business methods, computer programs from their patent acts 
but a similar proposal in the document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 darted 23
rd July, 1990 
was removed from the final draft (Dunkel Text, 20
th December 1991). The purpose was 
to extend the scope of patentable subject matter without any limit particularly when 
European Patent Conventions and the Patent Acts of its members had specifically 
excluded these items from the subject matter. The business methods, computer programs, 
abstract ideas, discoveries, have been excluded through various Supreme Court 
Judgements in the USA.
176  Only in 1998, business methods were permitted to be a 
patentable matter by the Court of Appeal in State Street, which was based more on the 




This is a curious international agreements which when it was started by the EC through a 
draft proposal (MTN.GNG/NG/11/W/68 dated 29
th March 1990), it started with much 
more stringent intellectual right provisions than was present in the domestic laws of the 
major proponent countries. It is quite understandable that the international negotiations 
start with extreme positions and then through negotiations a compromised middle 
solution is brought about. However, in case of TRIPS, the negotiations started with 
protections which were more stringent than the domestic patent laws of the major 
proponents which became much more stringent during the TRIPS negotiations and 
practically all the recommendations of the major groups of nations from developing 
countries were either rejected outright or were circumscribed by the terms which can 
make such provisions ineffective. One such provision is that of Article 8 of TRIPS which 
says  
 
“1.  Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2.  Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with provisions of this 
agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology.” 
 
The contents of the above provisions were essentially proposed by the developing 
countries and were reflected in paragraph 8 of the part V of MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 
dated 23
rd July, 1990 which reads as  
8.  Principles 
                                                                   
176 Daya Shanker, India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS, (2001) 
177 Daya Shanker, India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS (2001)   33 
8B.1  Parties recognize that intellectual property rights are granted not only in 
acknowledgement of the contributions of inventors and creators but also to assist in the 
diffusion of technological knowledge and its dissemination to those who could benefit 
from it in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and agree that this balance 
of rights and obligations inherent in all systems of intellectual property rights should be 
observed. 
 
8B.2  In formulating or amending their national laws and regulations on IPRs, 
PARTIES have the right to adopt appropriate measures to protect public morality, 
national security. Public health and nutrition, or to promote public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.” 
 
The circumscribing by the use of term “provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement” has been used by the EC to argue that objects and purpose 
of the TRIPS have no meaning as far as interpretations of other provisions of TRIPS are 
concerned and they perform no other functions except being there.
178  
 
Similarly, local working was accepted as one of the reasons for granting of compulsory 
licensing by the EC in its proposed draft.
179  However, on 16
th December 1991 in a 
‘10+10’ Meeting
180, the last clause of Article 27.1 was added
181 which states 
 
“Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of 
this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether 
products are imported or locally produced.” 
 
However, in view of Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention which specifically identified 
non-local working as one of the abuses for issuing compulsory licenses, local working 
continued to be a TRIPS compatible provisions and continued to be present in the 
European Patent Convention and the UK Patent Act till 1999 and in nearly all the Patents 
                                                                   
178 Canada-Patent Protection, para. 4.30(a) indent 3. The EC stated that “major feature” of the TRIPS 
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180 Canada-Pharmaceuticals, Note 74 and 75 
181 This is based on the argument of Canada in  Canada-Patent Protection,   in para 4.17 and the 
accompanying Note 74 and 75. Canada said, “A reference to the drafting history of Article 27.1 was 
instructive. It structure and wording reflected two separate negotiating thrusts: (a) a desire to ensure that 
subject to certain listed exceptions, patents would be available for inventions in all fields of technology; 
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Speaking Note of the Chairman (unpublished))”. There has been reference to non-discrimination clause 
previously but it appears to have been finalized at this meeting.   34 
Act of the developing countries under the impression that it is permitted under TRIPS.
182 
However, using Article 27.1, the USA raised the question of presence of local working in 
Brazil’s Patent Act and even when it withdrew the complaint, it was withdrawn with the 
assertion that the USA would pursue the matter aggressively for the removal of local 
working. 
 
Another point of issue is that of exhaustion of right. In normal commercial transactions, 
once the goods have been sold the buyer gets all the right in the goods. In case of the 
TRIPS Agreement, using the presence of term ‘power to exclude others from import’ in 
Article 28 has been used as a ground by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA)  to insist that buyer has no more right except what has been perceived 
by the right holder. The PhRMA’s argument did not have any logical support but the 
presence of importing patented products put in the market by the right holder in different 
Patent Acts was taken up by the USA who alleged that such provisions violate Article 28 
of TRIPS.
183 In fact, such local working is permitted by the Paris ‘Convention as 
incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement but the local working provisions present in the US 
Patent Act Sections 204
184 and 209
185 are not permitted and would be covered by Article 
27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.   
 
From the above discussion, it appears that Franck’s ‘coherence’ or Dworkin's ‘integrity’ 
or ‘consistency’ are not the most appropriate words applicable to the TRIPS Agreement.   
Further, requirement of coherence is that the international rules should be part of the 
“underlying general principle”. 
 
TRIPS was accepted with great reluctance by the majority of countries with the exception 
of the USA and the EC as a part of the Uruguay Round and even after it was accepted, 
there was great reluctance by the negotiating parties to reach an agreement. In fact, till 
the USA by introducing Special 301 and using it to coerce some of the major opponents 
of TRIPS into compliance, the majority of the WTO members were opposed to the 
introduction of TRIPS into WTO framework as the provisions of TRIPS were antithetical 
to the main issue of free trade.  Patents and Copyrights were essentially trade restrictive 
monopolies and only reason for their acceptance was to provide an incentive to the 
inventors.186 In fact, each and every provision in the TRIPS has a trade restrictive effect, 
and longer the monopolies stay, the greater the protection. In this respect, the effect of the 
TRIPS Agreement has been to distort the free trade structure erected by GATT 1994 and 
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Adherence (to a Normative Hierarchy) and Community  
 
While discussing his fourth factor of adherence, Franck identified “state equality” and 
“the  fundamental principle of international law that it prevails over domestic law” as 
“ultimate rules of recognition”. The question of equality between nations has been partly 
discussed by Dutfield
187 whose analysis of data suggest that when TRIPS emphasizes the 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property laws, it is emphasizing 
something which belongs to a particularly small group of nations.  
 
A large number of instances starting from PhRMA’s submission
188, the USTR’s
189 
categorization of different countries including the EC as violating the provisions of 
TRIPS and the discussions at Doha Ministerial Meetings, all suggest the ‘true 
community’ where the members accept that they are governed by common principles is 





Setear while trying to promote his view on game-theoretic approach of international law 
which he called as “An Iterative Perspective”, tried to criticize Franck’s approach on the 
basis that, “The legitimacy oriented perspective, therefore, suffers from difficulties in 
defining the various factors said to comprise legitimacy, and it being sure that legitimacy 
is in fact the desired metric at all.”
190 However, first Setear has ignored the fact that 
game-theoretic approach in economics is based essentially on a large number of strict 
assumptions which normally are not applicable in the real world and what Franck has 
tried to do is to develop an underlying theory as to why international rules are followed in 
the international relations when the nations are sovereign. There is no measure of 
determinacy, validity, coherence and adherence but they are not subjective and 
examination of any treaty would show that a treaty having significant presence of above 
factors does attract greater compliance. The most significant example is the Vienna 




Franck’s concept of legitimacy is not based on a very sound empirical foundation and has 
mostly  been supported by a large number of anecdotal evidence. It is more like Michael 
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Porter’s
192 analysis of competitive strategy and in similar manner provides an 
extraordinary powerful tool for analyzing the legitimacy of and compliance with 
international treaty.  
 
There appears to be a reluctance on the part of majority of countries both developed and 
the developing to accept the provisions of the TRIPS because of the circumstances in 
which it was prepared, the extraordinary role played by the interested trade associations 
and the antithetical emphasis on monopolistic control against free trade. 
 
However, greater legitimacy might by achieved by introducing suitable changes through 
modifications of Articles 1.1, 27 and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement to bring predictability 
and certainty. There has t o be certain norms for extension of monopolies. The 
extraordinary influence welded by certain industries and certain countries in the 
introduction and imposition of provisions which were not even part of the existing 
provisions in the domestic laws have converted TRIPS substantially into an illegitimate 
treaty. The introduction of appropriate norms is required to ensure that the limited 
monopolies to encourage progress of science and technical arts should not end up as a 
perpetuation of monopolies in the international context. The introduction of certainty and 
predictability in the TRIPS Agreement may help in bringing some form of legitimacy in 
this international agreement. Alternatively the TRIPS Agreement would be nothing but a 
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